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LAW SCHOOLS AND HUMAN RELATIONS
ERWIN N. GRISWOLDt
The Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lectureship was established in the
School of Law of Washington University by alumni of the school in 1949,
to honor the memory of a well-loved alumnus and faculty member whose
connection with and service to the school extended over the period 1898-
1947. This seventh annual lecture was delivered on April 19, 1955.
Whatever else may be said, this has been an interesting period in
which to live. No matter how things turn out, I would be inclined to
think that my generation, at least, has already had its money's worth.
It is now nearly ten years since the last great war was brought to a
close. Contrary to our expectations and hopes, these have not been
years of quiet and calm. Looking to our internal situation alone (while
recognizing that this is in considerable measure a reflection of ex-
ternal problems and tensions), these ten years have perhaps involved
more intense consideration of fundamental questions than any other
period in our history.
We have had extended public discussion of problems of separation
of powers, of the relative strength of the executive and the legislative
branches of the government, of the treaty power and its possible in-
ternal dangers, and, over much of the period, of the function and the
conduct of legislative investigations, and of the government's loyalty
and security program. The consideration of these questions has, I
think, been useful and helpful to the public as well as to those espe-
cially interested in the problems. It is good for citizens of today to
think back to fundamental conceptions of government, and to recall
the history which has given rise to our institutions. We have been
having a sort of continuing constitutional convention, with citizens
discussing basic questions to an extent unequalled since 1787. It is
good to have to rethink these problems, good for those who believe in
the institutions we have inherited to have to defend them.
t Dean and Langdell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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But there is, I think, some danger from overemphasis of these ques-
tions. For some time many persons who take to the public platform
have been preoccupied with questions of liberty, due process, govern-
mental power. Discussion of such questions is likely to involve a cer-
tain amount of emotion, and if we are not careful, we sometimes end
up with each side calling the other hysterical-perhaps justifiably. At
the very least we may develop a certain amount of national neurosis
out of continued introspective examination of our national govern-
mental anatomy. So I hope you will not mind if I devote my time to
something more prosaic. I plan to speak about some problems of legal
education.
Although these questions may not be as currently pressing or dra-
matic, it is part of my thesis today that they are important, and pub-
licly important. Figures recently compiled show that in the 83rd
Congress 308 out of 528 members of the House and Senate, or 58 per
cent, were lawyers. The proportion was the same in the legislature of
New York, though considerably lower in Illinois, Minnesota, and Mis-
souri. There is every reason to think that the proportion is consider-
able in other states. In addition, lawyers fill many administrative
posts in government, as well as all of the judicial offices. They are
high in the councils of business and in community affairs. They play
a leading part in the discussion of public questions, such as the prob-
lem of the Bricker Amendment, or the proper scope of Congressional
investigations.
The participation of lawyers in these matters is important, not only
quantitatively but also qualitatively. The fact is that the law schools
now attract a very large proportion of the intellectual capacity of our
young men, and they are in fact training a great many of the people
who will be in positions of leadership a generation hence. Surely, it is
possible to overestimate the influence which law schools may exert on
the outlook and thinking of their students who ultimately fill such
positions. It is just as easy, I am inclined to think, to underestimate
that influence. The influence of legal education on policy decisions
may not be immediate, but in the long run it may be very great, with
substantial consequences to our social, economic, and governmental
structure. Before he really knew how true his statement was, H. G.
Wells wrote in his Outline of History that "human history becomes
more and more a race between education and catastrophe."1
If we agree that law schools exert considerable influence on the
thinking of future leaders, we are under considerable obligation to
evaluate present day legal education to see if law schools are ade-
quately preparing their students for intelligent, responsible leader-
ship. For that reason it has seemed to me appropriate to attempt to
1. 4 WELLs, THE OUTLIxE OF HISTORY 1305 (4th ed. 1925).
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gather together here a number of somewhat loosely connected thoughts
about current legal education.
The nineteenth century was the century of analytical jurisprudence.
The legal thinking of that period was dominated by the writings of
Austin, and the Austinian approach remains dominant today, not only
in English legal thought but also in the legal thinking of American
lawyers. It was under the influence of Austin's purely logical ap-
proach that Dean Langdell developed the case method of instruction
eighty-five years ago. To him "the law" was to be found in books. The
library of the law school was its laboratory. And the books in which
"the law" could be found by the resourceful student were the de-
cisions of courts which spoke with authority. For convenience, and to
save wear and tear on the library books, these cases were gathered to-
gether into case books. But it was cases that the student studied. And
the method of study was analytical, virtually mechanical, with each
step being deduced by a purely logical process from the materials in
the authoritative cases.
It is not my purpose to oppose the case method of instruction. On
the contrary, it seems clear to me that Dean Langdell made a funda-
mental contribution to legal education and to the law when he pio-
neered with that method. In the first place, it quickly became appar-
ent that education was more effective when it dealt with concrete
problems than when it was presented in terms of abstract principles.
Secondly, the use of cases provided a remarkable vehicle for sharpen-
ing reasoning, for making nice distinctions, for emphasizing the
relevance of facts and the importance of slight factual variations. I
need not discuss in detail the virtues of the case method. That discus-
sion belongs to a period of fifty years or so ago. Since that time the
case method of instruction has established itself as the dominant
pedagogical instrument in American law schools. Thousands of bud-
ding American lawyers, under the guidance of skillful teachers using
this method, have been led to think as they have never thought before.
They have developed critical and acute minds while surveying factual
problems representing a considerable portion of the controversies in
which people become involved.
Of course this method, good as it is, is not beyond criticism. Some
twenty-five or thirty years ago, it was pointed out in vigorous terms
that the traditional case method has serious limitations. In the cases
studied, the facts are nearly always given. They have been found by
the lower court or determined by the verdict of a jury. Thus the stu-
dent whose attention is confined to decisions of appellate courts fails
to come into contact with the factual disputes and uncertainties which
make up a large part of the usual lawyer's work. This basis of crit-
icism is sometimes referred to as the "upper court myth." A good
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many words have been poured out in discussion of this and related
problems. I do not plan to review this material. Instead, I want to
point to some other, though perhaps related, problems which may be
a consequence of the prevailing use of analytical case methods of in-
struction.
I intend to discuss four problems. The first two problems are out-
growths of the minute analytical approach which the present case
system fosters. They might be called "the law teacher's dilemma" and
"the development of technicians." The third problem results from the
almost exclusive use of case material. It might be called "the forgot-
ten areas of the law." The fourth problem is related to the third in
that it has been too long a neglected area in law school training-the
problem of professional responsibility. Let me now develop these
points in a little greater detail.
1. The law teacher is faced with the real dilemma of covering
ground, for want of which he may be called inadequate, or of minutely
covering many possible variations of a particular fact situation in the
cases, without which he may be regarded as superficial. This dilemma
stems largely from the fact that the case method is essentially analyti-
cal. It leads to intensive dissection of problems. This is, of course, one
of its great merits. But, as the problems are dissected, they prolifer-
ate. The fields of the law continually increase. The problems within
each field divide and subdivide. Every time it is shown that a slight
change of the facts of a case introduces new considerations, another
problem is presented which the teacher is likely to feel obligated to
cover. This was well enough in the early days of case teaching, for
the law then was still in need of organizing and sytematization. Now
it presents special burdens which merit our attention.
2. This overemphasis on dissection has a great impact on the law
student's thinking. It fosters a bar of technicians, who tend to look
for detail rather than for larger issues. The ecase method, arising out
of litigated controversies, may be more logical and precise than the
law actually is. The case method, without some supplementation or
corrective, may lead to too much legalism, to too much of what even
the lawyer recognizes as technicality. Even in the logical area, it may
be deficient in the premises and factual material with which it deals.
There is some tendency, with the case method, for the study of law to
be something like the study of chess or the analysis of a bridge hand.
When analyzing the law in intricate detail, it may be hard to keep in
mind the vital fact that the problems really relate to people, either
the people who are parties to the case, or the people who will be
affected by the law established once the case is decided.
The premises on which much of our law is based may be much too
narrow. In recent years case method instruction has been supple-
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mented by references to materials from economics and sociology and
other related fields. But it is only in the hands of a very expert teacher
that these materials have any reality for the law student. The surface
tension surrounding the strictly legal materials is very high, and it is
very hard for other ideas and materials to break in. Besides, courts
do not ordinarily pay much attention consciously to these materials off
the legal chess board, so they do not very often appear in the cases
which the student studies. Thus it is easy for the student to conclude
that nothing off the chess board is really very important.
3. My third, and perhaps the most important observation for the
purposes of this lecture, concerns what might be called the forgotten
areas of law practice, the problems which do not appear in upper
court decisions-human problems, presented and solved in the law-
yer's office. The case method provides a very effective way for the
student to get a detailed knowledge of the law as it is administered by
appellate courts. This is essential background for the student's prac-
tice. But in most instances it is little more than background. The law
in many fields may be likened to a map. If you go too far this way,
you will get into trouble. If you go too far that way, you may resolve
your present problem, but you will then be confronted with another.
The law establishes boundaries, and marks out doubtful or troubled
areas. But it by no means covers the whole field of human relations.
There are many situations where the lawyer's advice is not based on
essentially legal considerations. Should there be a corporate or an in-
dividual trustee? What provision should be made in the will for the
wayward son? Should the executor be bonded? How can an unhappy
couple be brought together? In such situations the problems are not
essentially legal. They are often problems of human relations, and
the case method, dealing with upper court decisions, may shed very
little light on how to deal with them.
4. The fourth problem, the failure to impart a fully adequate sense
of legal responsibility in practicing attorneys, is not necessarily a
product of the case method of teaching. However, it is an illustration
of the type of education which the case method is ill-adapted to im-
part. Many law schools have not found adequate ways to make their
students fully aware of the history and traditions of the legal profes-
sion, or to give them a sense of professional solidarity and responsi-
bility. It is apparently the fact that many young lawyers start in
practice without an adequate knowledge of the essentials of legal
ethics. The fundamental elements here, of course, are honesty and
character, and these things are probably best inculcated through in-
structors of honesty and character. But it may well be that many law
teachers have never had any direct contact with the basic practical
problems of legal ethics, and do not know the practices developed by
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lawyers to deal with these questions. Many young lawyers, for ex-
ample, do not seem to know that they should keep clients' funds in a
separate account. They think it is enough if they keep a proper record
of how much they owe their clients. Nor do they fully understand that
they must never use the clients' funds for themselves. They expect to
repay, without fully understanding that they are trustees of these
funds and that they cannot properly use them for themselves even for
a little while. I gather that something like half of the time of griev-
ance committees of bar associations is taken up with matters of this
sort. If some effective way could be worked out to make these simple
matters clear to students in law school, it might be a great contribu-
tion to the public and to the bar, as well as to the law students.
I suspect that there are not a great many points or principles in
this field of legal ethics that need to be taught. Yet as law schools are
now organized, it is hard to teach even these few essentials. By and
large, the rules and practices are not subject to effective teaching by
the case method. They do not fit very well into any particular course;
and there are already far too many courses in the curriculum. As far
as lectures go, students do not like being preached to; most law teach-
ers do not like doing the preaching; and there is little if anything to
indicate that such an approach is effective anyway. Is there some
other means of sound instruction in this area?
Having stated these problems, it is natural to consider what can be
done about them. I have no clear solution. But I would like to venture
some observations with the hope that they may stimulate further
thought in others. Specifically, I would like to suggest that it might
help if we were to recognize more clearly and effectively the fact that
law is one of the social sciences.
The law is surely the oldest body of organized knowledge in the
field of human relations. It ought to be a leader among the social
sciences, a central core of basic knowledge to which others would turn.
It is well for the law to be impersonal when it is applied in decisions.
But the lawyer in his day to day work might well find it advantageous
to think less impersonally than he ordinarily does.
The lawyer is constantly dealing with human beings; he is con-
tinuously concerned with the adjustment of human relations. It is by
no means clear to me that the traditional case method alone ade-
quately prepares the lawyer to think of his work in terms of the ad-
justment of human relations. I am not thinking of the talk we have
heard about how the decision all depends on what the judge had for
breakfast. I think that such talk is very easily overdone. Judges are
trained to think analytically and impersonally. We know far too little
about the bases of judicial decision, what it is that really persuades a
judge to go one way or another. What he has been taught in law
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school probably has a good deal to do with it. On the whole, the train-
ing that students receive in law school prepares them quite well for
presenting materials to judges. Nor am I thinking about persuading
jurors. That is a special field in itself, no doubt best learned in the
courtroom. Even in law school, though, students might well learn
that jurors are human, and that they should be dealt with as people.
Social scientists have developed knowledge in the field of human re-
lations which would be of use to lawyers in dealing with human be-
ings. However, very little of this knowledge has been imparted to the
average lawyer as a result of his law school experience. Fortunately,
some lawyers acquire some knowledge of these matters as a result of
their practice, but it is usually the empirical sort that may be referred
to as "savvy." Many lawyers never do seem to understand that they
are dealing with people and not solely with the impersonal law. How
far is law school education responsible for this lack?
Of course, all law deals with human relations. But my point is
that as it exists in its more or less scientific form, and as it is taught,
it does not deal very much with people. Yet lawyers constantly deal
with people. They deal with people far more than they do with ap-
pellate courts. They deal with clients; they deal with witnesses; they
deal with persons against whom demands are made; they carry on
negotiations; they are constantly endeavoring to come to agreements
of one sort or another with people, to persuade people, sometimes
people who are very reluctant to be persuaded. Lawyers are con-
stantly dealing with people who are under stress or strain of one
sort or another. How do people act in such situations? Do law stu-
dents ever learn anything about this at all?
A problem for a lawyer is likely to start with the arrival of a client.
When the client comes to the lawyer, he may be affected by fear,
anxiety, and helplessness. The lawyer cannot successfully handle
such a person on a wholly impersonal basis. To do an effective job,
the lawyer must be aware of the client's personal situation; he must
seek to understand and evaluate the client. He must anticipate story
distortion due to these feelings. While understanding the client's
feelings, the lawyer must seek to keep his own feelings from being
involved. Often a client is accompanied by persons of varied training
having a particular point of view, a particular end in view, not neces-
sarily coinciding with that of the client, for example, an accountant,
a sales manager, a labor union representative. The lawyer must under-
stand these persons as well, their values, their prejudices, their mo-
tives.
Of course, the law student cannot be told the answers to the in-
finite variety of problems which are presented by human relationships.
But much could be done to make him explicitly aware that these
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problems exist, and to make him be more on the lookout for factors
of this sort. Law students could be given a greater awareness of
other persons, of their thoughts, motives, hopes, *and feelings. At
least a stop and think attitude could be developed; the young lawyer
could learn the importance of considering problems from the other
person's eyes.
Very little along this line is imparted to law students by the un-
modified case method of instruction. Of course, the point is made
that any law student should know enough to use his common sense.
I have been struck, though, by the number of times experienced prac-
titioners have asked me why it is that newly admitted members of
the bar seem to have checked their common sense outside the office
door. Can it be that the case method of instruction is partly to blame
because it lends itself so well to the impersonal, chess board attitude
toward law, obscuring the humble human relationships which law
is intended to serve and with which the lawyer must deal?
Through better knowledge of human relations, lawyers might
achieve a better understanding of themselves and their relation to
the problems with which they have to deal. Persons who have studied
problems of human relations have come to the conclusion that special-
ists, particularly those who have engaged in rigorous intellectual
training, are least likely to develop an understanding of human re-
lations. Such persons tend to be confined by the limits of their own
training. The lawyer on being presented with a problem is likely to
look at once to the elaborate constructions of his art and perhaps to
overlook some rather obvious factor of human relations which may
make his learning irrelevant or unimportant. Moreover, one of the
basic tenets of human relations is that the behavior of the average
man is likely to be non-logical. The lawyer with his training in
logical processes may find it difficult to understand that logic may not
be the most effective tool for him to use in attempting to understand
or to persuade a non-lawyer. The emphasis which the lawyer places
on correct reasoning and on the superiority of logic may lead to the
development of a condescending attitude on his part towards those
less intellectually endowed or verbally adept.
Another propensity found to be common among specialists is an
aversion to new ideas. I think it may fairly be said that lawyers as a
class are not very receptive to new ideas. Could it be that the nature
of their training is in part responsible for this trait?
A good deal of work has been done on problems of human relations
in other fields, much of which could be of use to lawyers. Business
schools and medical schools often have courses in human relations,
usually taught by the case method. The military services have used
the knowledge developed in this field to great advantage. Business
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corporations have found this sort of instruction valuable for training
their executives and supervisory employees. Graduate schools of soci-
ology and of social relations have done much work in the fields of so-
cial psychology, cultural anthropology, and other fields of human re-
lationa. A good deal of work has been done in the field of group
dynamics. Prominent among those working in this general area is
David Riesman of the University of Chicago, a man whose basic so-
cial science training was in the law.
The leading book in the area is entitled Human Relations: Concepts
and Cases in Concrete Social Science, by Hugh Cabot and Joseph A.
Kahl. The Harvard Business School has published a volume of papers
on The Case Method of Teaching Human Relations and Administra-
tion, edited by Kenneth R. Andrews. Reference may also be made to
two rather journalistic books by Stuart Chase in this general area.
They are called The Proper Study of Mankind and Roads to Agree-
ment.
How much of this material can be developed for use with law stu-
dents, I do not know. Probably not very much of it is readily adapt-
able. The effective scientific work on many of these problems is often
rather primitive. But there are two things that law schools could do
with the field of human relations. They could (1) begin to work in it
themselves, and develop a body of material in the field especially pre-
pared for the use of lawyers and law students. They could (2) do
more to make students aware of the human relations factors which
permeate all that they do. If students could at least be oriented so that
they would as a matter of course think about these problems, it would
be a great step forward. If that were done, then in due course lawyers
and judges would be more aware of these problems and we would
develop materials specifically dealing with lawyers' problems of hu-
man relations.
Let us look at some areas of the law and see how a greater aware-
ness of problems of human relations might contribute to the work we
do.
1. Of course, the whole area of criminal law deals with intense prob-
lems of human relations. I suspect, though, that all the law the lawyer
really needs to have at his finger tips in this field could be taught in a
relatively short period. The hard problems are human problems.
Problems of crime prevention and of the treatment of criminals, which
are the really important problems in the criminal law field, are prob-
lems of human relations, and scarcely at all of law. In the juvenile
delinquency area, my colleagues, Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, have
done exciting work in developing factors for predicting the tendency
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to delinquency.2 With the potential delinquents thus recognized at an
early age, and before they have become actual delinquents, it is pos-
sible to undertake treatment designed to prevent or minimize the de-
linquency which might otherwise develop. Such treatment is actually
being carried out now in a number of locations.
Students and lawyers should be more aware than they are of these
approaches to the difficult problem of crime. The whole area of parole
and probation is one in which the problems turn to a very large extent
on matters of human relations. All the indications are that it is much
cheaper to prevent and minimize crime than it is to incarcerate people
after they have committed crimes. Yet how far are our law students,
and thus our lawyers, made aware of the possibilities in this field?
Indeed, how far are they left with any interest in criminal law? Can
it be that the pure case method of instruction, focused as it is on de-
cisions of appellate courts which necessarily can deal with the situa-
tion only after there has been a conviction for a crime, unnecessarily
limits the horizons of our law students and thus of our lawyers in this
area?
2. Nov let us look at the whole field of torts. This is one in which,
it seems to me, the legal profession in all its branches has most sig-
nally failed to do a good job. I am thinking of course of the usual
automobile case. In a great many large cities, it now takes four or five
years, after issue is reached, before such a case can be tried. In the
meantime, the widow and children may be starving, to put it at its
worst. At the very best there may be considerable hardship from the
long delay. Loss of evidence may cause injustice one way or the other,
apart from the difficulty resulting from the delay.
Yet, though this, problem is clear and has long been pressing, what
have we lawyers done about it? There has been quite a bit of talk, but
the results are surely disappointing. The lawyer in practice represent-
ing a client with such a claim seeks to effect a settlement; and of
course he often does settle, though sometimes at a considerable sacri-
fice because of the threat of delay if he does not come to terms. If he
cannot settle, then there is nothing to do but sue and wait. In a few
states arbitration procedures have developed. One province in Canada
has put into effect a system along the general lines of our workmen's
compensation laws. But in general we have nothing to offer but settle,
or wait a long time. Would the lawyers be more successful in finding
a solution to this problem if it were natural for them to think of the
human factors involved instead of directing their thinking to law suits
and cases?
3. An obvious area for this approach is the field of domestic rela-
2. See, e.g., ELEANOR AND SHELDON GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY (1950).
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tions. There is some law here, of course, but the problems are essen-
tially ones of human relations in their most intense and complex
forms. Recent instruction in law schools has recognized this to some
extent, but it seems likely that more could be done.
In this connection, a word of caution is in order. As David Riesman
has pointed out,3 there is surely value in a lawyer's maintaining his
detachment from his clients' problems. But this does not lessen the
lawyer's need to develop real understanding of those problems. Simi-
larly, it is surely true that it is not desirable for lawyers to undertake
to embrace all knowledge and to take over responsibility for all func-
tions in our society. But lawyers should have wisdom. Wisdom may
well be a function of outlook and approach as well as of technical
knowledge.
4. Another field in which a lawyer's understanding of human rela-
tions could be of great importance is that of labor relations. Indeed,
I think it may fairly be said that lawyers as a class got off to a very
bad start in this area because of their failure to appreciate that the
basic problems were ones of human relations and not of law. One does
not have to think back very far to recall the period when the usual
activity of a lawyer in labor matters was to rush in to some court and
get an injunction. This may have broken some strikes but it did not
ordinarily contribute to good labor relations. After the legislature
restricted the use of injunctions in labor disputes, it was necessary to
do more negotiating. For a long time most lawyers were not very
effective at this. They did not understand human relations very well.
They had a tendency to lay down the law, to be inflexible, to be su-
perior, to be domineering. Of course in many situations, they were
carrying out the instructions of their clients, who felt that the only
way to deal with the unions was to be tough with them and show them
that you would not take any of their talk. By and large that method of
approach did not work out very well, particularly after the Wagner
Act.
During this period lawyers as a class were rather unpopular in
labor negotiations. The reason, I think, was the general inadequacy of
their preparation and their lack of appreciation of the human factors
involved in this sort of work. Now I think it is a fact that lawyers
have much to contribute in labor relations. But they must do it with a
full awareness of the complications of human relations, and with very
little reference to the framework of law which forms the background
of their work. Here is a field in which the other fellow's ego must be
recognized. Often a successful strike results in a net loss to the em-
ployees. They must work for years at the increased wages won by the
3. Riesman, Some Observations on Law and Psychology, 19 U. CHi. L. REV.
30, 34-85 (1951).
4. 49 STAT. 452-457 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 155-166 (1947).
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strike in order to make up the amount they lost through idleness while
the strikewas on. But these matters are not solved on a logical or
even an economic basis. The problems are often human rather than
monetary. If the union gets a raise, it has won the strike. It has
status. It has made its members feel important. That is worth much
on the bargaining table. It is more important for a labor lawyer to
know and recognize and work with these attitudes than it is for him
to know the latest decision of the court of appeals.
Many of these points have recently been developed in the Holmes
Lecture given by Dean Harry Shulman at the Harvard Law School
only a month before his recent untimely death. This Lecture has just
been published in the April issue of the Harvard Law Review under
the title "Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations." It is a great
illustration of the important role a lawyer can play in labor relations
when he properly understands his function. This is highlighted by
Dean Shulman's concluding sentence, where he said, with respect to
labor arbitration: "I suggest that the law stay out but, mind you, not
the lawyers."' '
Recently I saw a public relations periodical put out by an iron and
steel institute. It showed a picture of the president of a steel company
and the president of the union jointly touring one of the company's
plants. The president of the union was dressed the same way the
president of the company was, with well-tailored suit, neat collar and
tie, and what appeared to be a brand new light gray hat. Whether the
president of the union arrived in a Cadillac or not did not appear.
Such a picture it seems to me is good human relations. Too long people
representing employers have failed to see that what the workers
wanted most of all was to be someone, to be accepted as important, as
belonging, as being as essential to the plant as the boss. When we
think of people as people, and not as cases, we realize these things.
I suspect that a good deal of human relations is now introduced into
our law school courses in labor law. That may be one reason why
lawyers are, I think, now playing a more important and influential
part in labor relations than they did some years ago.
5. Finally, I would like to make brief reference to one other area.
We have recently had a good deal of discussion about congressional
and legislative investigations, and about people claiming the benefit of
the privilege against self-incrimination. There has been much conflict
of opinion and misunderstanding in this area, and a spate of contro-
versy about the problem. I do not for a moment think that all of the
people who claim the benefit of the Fifth Amendment are admirable
characters. I find myself wondering, though, whether there is not a
5. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REV.
999 (1955).
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large human relations aspect to this matter. Out of every hundred
people who are picked at random, there are likely to be some who are
meek and tractable, and some others who are reasonable, who will
adjust themselves to an unpleasant situation and try to make the best
of it. But there will also be a certain number who just do not like to be
pushed around. That of course is a characteristic of all of us, which
we control to a greater or lesser degree. In history it has often been
conscientious people like the Quakers who have been troublesome and
have not been very good at conforming to prevailing mores. Quakers
would not take an oath, and we finally had sense enough to let them
"affirm." Just the other day, though, the Supreme Court decided a
case that should never have had to go there. A federal court would not
let witnesses take the stand unless they would "solemnly" affirm, and
the court of appeals approved that ruling.6 This was of course largely
a matter of human relations. The judge apparently wanted to impose
his will on the witnesses, and the witnesses did not want to be imposed
upon. After much delay, the case came to the Supreme Court, where
the decision was reversed per curiam, the Court merely observing that
there was no basis for requiring that an affirmation be done "sol-
emnly."7 I find myself wondering whether a little greater flexibility
and understanding introduced into law school instruction might not
have obviated the bootless decision by the two lower courts in this case.
Returning now to our Fifth Amendment cases, we should recall that
some witnesses have felt that they were put to much provocation. In
such a situation, a claim of the Fifth Amendment may be little more
than a successful way of maintaining the integrity of one's person-
ality. This may not be a legitimate use of the Amendment, but it may
nevertheless be a natural reaction for some people. If we are really
trying to understand what happens in these cases, we should not
overlook this very real possibility.
Before closing, I want to refer to one other problem of legal educa-
tion, which may seem inconsistent with what I have been trying to
say, though I think that it is not essentially inconsistent.
One thing, it seems to me, is clear about legal education. It is try-
ing to do too much already. How then can it possibly take on this task
of acquainting law students with the problems of human relations?
We have already discussed several problems resulting from the undue
emphasis on the analytical approach stimulated by a too rigid adher-
ence to the traditional case method of teaching. In discussing the law
teacher's dilemma, no solution was offered. Clearly, though, the fact
that law schools are trying to do too much and the fact that law
teachers are almost forced to become enmeshed in detail are related.
6. United States v. Moore, 217 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1954).
7. Moore v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 531 (1955).
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It may well be that the next great developments in legal education will
be in the direction of consolidating and simplifying. As one of my
friends has said, we have for too long been teaching less and less
about more and more. We should now reverse this tendency, and con-
sciously seek to teach more and more about less and less. Or, as one
of my colleagues has said, we should sink some shafts, but not try to
make tracks over the entire field. If more of this were done, it might
be. possible to make more use of new materials and new approaches.
It is no longer possible for a student to know all the law. Nor is it
either necessary or desirable. The colleges have faced a similar prob-
lem, and have evolved a workable solution in terms of general educa-
tion. Perhaps we need some of the general education approach in the
law school. What would happen if half as much time were spent on
the problems of consideration in contracts as is now the case? What
would happen if half as much time were spent on negligence---or un-
disclosed principal? Students should of course know that these things
exist. They should have their minds sharpened on some aspects of
these problems. But we may be, I fear, trying to pump too much
minutiae into our students for their own good. We might be able to
give them what they really need with broader strokes, and with less
detail.
A lawyer's education is never done. If we prepare our students so
that they are able to tackle any problem that comes along, working it
out in detail when they need to do so, we may accomplish more for
them and for society than if we try to give them, all the details in
school. And if by some such reorganization of present legal education,
we make time available for better consideration of problems of human
relations, we might make a fundamental contribution not only to our
students but also to the society which they serve. If their outlook is
too narrow, if their horizons are too limited, to allow them to be the
effective advisers they should be, the schools have a considerable obli-
gation to find the cause of the defect and to cure it.
In this connection, I cannot refrain from mentioning the matter of
expense. Law schools in this country have long been operated on a
shoestring. They and their students and the public have suffered from
that approach. The Adviser to the Section of Legal Education of the
Ainerican Bar Association recently compiled some significant figures.
In 1953-54, a total of $14,700,000 was spent on legal education in 95
law schools. In the same year, 80 medical schools spent over $90,000,-
000, and if their research expenditures are added in, the total expendi-
ture was over $132,000,000, or more than nine times the expenditures
of the law schools. As the Adviser, Mr. Hervey, said: "In short, the
amount spent on legal education in the United States is negligible in
comparison with the amount spent on medical education."
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Only one law school in this country spent as much as one million
dollars. Yet 38 out of 80 medical schools have budgets in excess of
$1,000,000. In fact, only one medical school has a budget of less than
$400,000, while 50 of the 95 reporting law schools had budgets of less
than $100,000. As Mr. Hervey said: "Law schools have dealt in thou-
sands of dollars while medical schools have dealt in hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars." It is not for me to assess the relative importance
of legal and medical education, but I am prepared to assert that the
importance is not as disproportionate as the financial support which
these two groups of schools receive would seem to indicate. If the
training of lawyers has been inadequate over the past many years,
if they have not served the public as well as they should, these figures
may well furnish some explanation.
Lawyers are not very good at their own public relations, and per-
haps that is as it should be. But lawyers could do an even better job
than they are now doing if they had a broader education in law school.
And the law schools could do a better job if they could get farther
away from mass production methods, which they could do if they had
better financial support. I have tried to point out in this lecture one of
the lines which development in legal education might take. Law
schools would perform a service to their students and to the public if
they developed means to make the students more effectively aware of
problems of human relations.
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